This study analyses the extent of voluntary business risk disclosure from airlines-aviation companies in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries over the period of three years (2009)(2010)(2011). The results of this study indicate that level of business risk disclosure is relatively consistent high level in 62.71%-64.71%. Multiple regression analysis provides evidence that country cluster, size, leverage and load factor are positively significantly associated with business risk disclosure while government ownership impact negatively. Further ANOVA analysis showed that the highest business disclosure are from Anglo-Saxon airlines/aviation companies and the lowest voluntary business risk disclosure shown by those of emerging markets.
Introduction
Corporate voluntary disclosure has long captured significant attention in the accounting literature. Prior studies indicate that increased disclosure can reduce transaction costs, increase demand for a firm's stock and, eventually, improve market liquidity. Healy and Palepu (2001) note that high levels of information disclosure can reduce the uncertainty surrounding a particular firm, thereby allowing investors/potential investors to obtain more accurate and less volatile earnings forecasts. Schuster and O'Connel (2006 7) maintain that "improved disclosure is likely to lead to improvements in shareholders' capital-allocation decisions as well as their assessment of risk-adjusted return. Hence, from a macroeconomics perspective, increased disclosure should lead to improvements in the market's role as a capital allocation mechanism". Haddad et al. (2009) find that enhanced voluntary disclosure helps to reduce bid-ask spreads, which lowers the cost of capital and thereby improves market liquidity.
Due to recent widespread financial crises, such as the global financial crisis and dramatic corporate collapses, regulators and investors around the globe have increasingly demanded that corporate disclosure extend beyond mere financial information. Barako (2004) states that voluntary disclosure of non-financial information helps to enhance a firm's share value as well as its social reputation. One aspect of nonfinancial disclosure relates to the communication of risk information (Linsley and Shrives, 2006) . state that risk reporting represents an extension of corporate disclosure into non-traditional areas in response to increased demand for corporate accountability and ethical behavior. Beretta and Bozzoland (2004) argue that continuous changes and uncertainties relating to business regulations, operations and strategies have made it challenging for investors to fully comprehend corporate disclosures. A lack of sufficient risk information may lead to several problems in the market, including high transaction costs, thin markets, low liquidity, decreased gains from trades and unprofitable investments (Miihkinen, 2013) . To improve the market, it is imperative that all companies engage in additional risk reporting.
There have been calls from around the globe for increased regulations of risk disclosure. For instance, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) urges that risk information be made available in the annual reports of UK firms (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004) . The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) also suggests that risk information be disclosed in firms' annual reports (IASB, 2008) . Specifically, IAS 1-Presentation of Financial Statements requires a company to disclose its financial risk management objectives and policies as well as management's assessment of essentially all risks faced by the company. Moreover, IAS 32-Financial Instruments: Presentation requires that firms provide additional information about major uncertainties and certain specific risks .
Within the existing literature, many studies of risk disclosures have been conducted. Linsley and Shrives (2006) investigate risk disclosures in the annual reports of UK companies. Hassan (2009) examines the level of risk disclosure by firms in the United Arab Emirates, whereas Hassan et al. (2011) study the risk reporting practices of listed firms in Egypt. More recently, explore the extent of risk disclosure by Australian, Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean firms during the global financial crisis period. Although the number of recent studies reflects an increasing trend in riskreporting research, additional research is needed. Linsley and Shrives (2006) state that in order to develop a better understanding of the motivations for corporate risk disclosure, more risk disclosure studies should be encouraged , including studies in a crosscountry setting and industry-specific studies. This study reflects an attempt to respond to this call for additional research. By examining the effects of variables such as country cluster, company size, government ownership, managerial ownership, board independence and auditor type, this study enables stakeholders to gain a deeper understanding of corporate risk disclosure practices as well as providing the extension to the existing voluntary disclosure literature.
The objectives of this study are twofold: a) to investigate the extent of risk disclosure by airlines/aviation companies in the Asia-Pacific region and b) to explore potential determinants of such disclosures.
The focus on airlines/ aviation companies is based on several reasons. First, previous studies provide evidence that variations in corporate risk disclosure can be explained by differences between specific industries (Hassan, 2009 ). Beretta and Bozzoland (2004) state that the types of risk that a firm must address depend on the nature of the industry in which it operates. Consequently, previous studies have investigated risk reporting practices in specific industries, including the manufacturing industry Dobler et al., 2011) , the mining/resources industry (Taylor et al., 2010) , the food industry (Abraham and Cox, 2007) and the banking industry (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013) . However, no risk disclosure study to date has investigated the airlines/aviation industry. Financial reporting and disclosure by the airlines/aviation industry is quite different from that of other industries (Tan et al., 2002) . Thus, this study of risk reporting in the airlines/aviation industry adds to the extant literature.
Second, the airlines/aviation industry is considered a risky industry because it is susceptible to economic conditions and global recessions. Fernando (2006) points out that during periods of recession, many airlines report lower earnings or even substantial losses. Heavy fare discounting, high and volatile fuel costs, intense competition and other disadvantageous environmental pressures are among the challenges continuously faced by the airlines/aviation industry (Berghofer and Lucey, 2014) . Furthermore, it is also vulnerable to security failures and other unexpected events, such as the hijacking of airplanes on September 11 th 2011 in the United States, the air mishaps experienced by Malaysia Airlines and Taiwan's TransAsia Airways in 2014, and human and drug smuggling. According to Miihkinen (2013) , investors require more risk information from risky firms. Thus, the dynamics of this risky industry and its public perception make it a very interesting field for the study of risk disclosure practices.
Third, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) region is chosen for this study because of its growing importance in the world economy. Currently, APEC countries account for approximately 40% of the global population, approximately 55% of global GDP and approximately 44% of global trade (APEC, 2014). As the region with the most dynamic economies in the world, the Asia-Pacific area has become the center of gravity of the world economy (Weixing, 2009 ). Given the growing attention focused on risk disclosure and the uniqueness of the airlines/aviation industry, this study provides an important extension to the current literature on risk disclosure.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature regarding theoretical framework and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the research design and methodology, and Section 4 presents the findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical framework and hypothesis development
Studies on risk reporting have adopted various theories. This study develops risk disclosure hypotheses based on agency theory because this theory is most often employed by accounting researchers (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Taylor et al., 2010; Dobler et al., 2011) . According to agency theory, information asymmetry is a central issue in the relationship between the principals of a firm (shareholders) and their agents (managers). Information asymmetry exists because managers have information advantages over shareholders (Su et al., 2010; Colgan, 2001; Ahmed, 2009 ). Agency theorists argue that due to the separation of ownership and control, managers are motivated to disclose more information to reduce the information asymmetry gap (Chau and Gray, 2002 According to Cabedo and Tirado (2004) , there are three types of risk associated with a company: business risk, strategic risk, and financial risk. Business risk relates to possible changes in a company's competitive advantages, including advantages related to product design, technological innovation, marketing strategies and other company characteristics that add value for shareholders. Strategic risk relates to major fluctuations in the economic and political environments in which the company operates, and financial risk relates to the possibility of losses in financial markets (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004) . This paper focuses solely on the disclosure of business risk by airlines/aviation companies.
Country cluster
According to Nobes (1998) , a country cluster is a group of countries with similar cultures and environments. Nobes (1998) The log of total asset The Proportion of Independent Board The percentage of independent directors to total directors on boards.
The Proportion of Government Ownership
The percentage of government shares in the company over the total shares.
The Proportion of Managerial Ownership
The percentage of managers' shares in the company over the total shares.
Control variables Auditor
Code (1) (for auditors, who are the Big4) and 0 (for auditors, who are non-the Big4). Profitability ROA = after taxes income/ total asset Leverage Leverage = total debt/ total asset The proportion of load factor Load Factor = RPK/ ASK
Size
Firm size is often reported as a significant explanatory variable in existing voluntary disclosure studies. According to Hossain et al. (1995) , agency costs increase with firm size. Thus, it is expected that larger firms will have greater incentives to provide information to reduce their agency costs. Previous studies (Vu et 
Corporate governance
Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that the agency problem can be mitigated by having an effective board of directors that includes a high number of independent directors. A higher number of independent directors facilitates monitoring activities and provides more discipline for management on behalf of shareholders (Cormier et al., 2010) 
Government ownership
Airlines/aviation companies in most developing countries are still susceptible to government intervention, especially as it relates to the impact of economic liberalization on the ownership of airlines/aviation companies (Chang et al., 2004) . Being the dominant shareholder, the government can also control the firms through their influential legal power. Firms with higher government ownership face fewer information asymmetry problems because government generally has better access to a firm's internal information than other stakeholders (Naser et al., 2002; Xiao and Yuan, 2007) . Vu et al. (2011) note that being the sole authority may give a government enough power to obtain firm information through unconventional channels; thus, the demand for information from government-owned firms is generally lower, which results in a lower level of information disclosure by government-owned firms. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:
There is a negative association between government ownership and the level of business risk disclosure by airlines/aviation firms in the APEC region.
Managerial ownership
Agency theory posits that managerial ownership can eliminate agency costs because a manager who owns company shares will bear the company's losses and share in the company's profits. Thus, a higher level of managerial ownership helps to align the interests of managers and stockholders, which may motivate managers to disclose additional information on a voluntary basis. Empirically, the results are somewhat mixed. Nagar et al. 
Dependent variable
To measure the extent of risk disclosure, this study adopts the index used in the study of (1) is given for each business risk item disclosed by a company, and a score of zero (0) is given otherwise. The total business risk disclosure index (BRDI) for each company is the percentage obtained by dividing the company's total score by the total number of items in the disclosure index (28) . The list of disclosure items is presented in Table 3 . Effect of the application of the strategy in the current year * 3
Influence the strategy for the future * 4
Qualitative disclosure at the discretion of the acquisition for the current year * 5
Qualitative disclosure at the discretion of disposals for the year * 6
Qualitative disclosures with respect to the future prospects of the business * 7
Explanations related to major projects being handled by the company in the current year the company * 8
The company's commitment in regards to the cost of capital * 9
Security policy * 10 Data related accidents that occur * 11 Costs associated with safety measures * 12 Safety of the products * 13 Changes in fuel prices and its impact on the company ** 14 Risk factors associated with terrorism and international hostilities ** 15 Competitive environment and competitors analysis** 16 Impacts of changes in international, regional and local significant on the airline industry ** 17 Effects of economic conditions beyond the airlines control** 18 Obligations ( debt and bonds ) and risks that may be encountered with regard to the liabilities held ** 19 Trade union disputes , employee strikes and disorders associated with other labor airline business ** 20 Government or government actions beyond the control of the airline ( regulatory risk ) such as foreign exchange risk ** 21 Effects related to changes in interest rates and hedging activities used by the airline ** 22 Risks associated with communication and technology used by the airline ** 23 Significant losses faced by the airline ** 24 Restructuring or bankruptcy risk faced by the aviation industry which could affect other related airline ** 25 Personnel issues ( management ) that significantly affect the success of the airline * 26 Risks associated with dependence on suppliers in the provision of services such as fuel technology , and other services are important for the airline industry ** 27 Interruption in services by airports to airlines ** 28 Employee pension costs in particular are filed early retirement ** Note: * Items adopted from 12 business risk disclosure items ). ** Items adopted from 21 airline risk factors of KPMG's Disclosures Handbook (KPMG, 2006)
Independent variables
As mentioned above, the independent variables in this study are country cluster, firm size, corporate governance mechanism, state ownership and managerial ownership. Table 1 describes the measurement of each of these variables.
Control Variables

Auditor type
It is assumed that large auditing firms are more concerned about their reputations; thus, they are more likely either to associate with companies that disclose adequate information or to encourage their clients to disclose additional information. Past studies indicate that firms with high agency costs tend to choose highquality auditors to reduce those costs (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007).
Profitability
Extant studies often report a significant positive relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and firm profitability (Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). Agency theory posits that highly profitable companies tend to disclose more risk information in interim reports to justify their performance to shareholders (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012).
Leverage
The leverage ratio is widely used as the measurement proxy in disclosure studies (Xiao et al., 2004; Hossain et al., 1994; Barako et al., 2006) . To reduce agency costs and improve information asymmetry, the managers of a firm with higher leverage may disclose more information to creditors, suppliers and investors to assure them that the firm is capable of meeting its financial obligations (Al-shammari and Al-sultan, 2010).
Load factor
Load factor can be a key determinant of disclosure in the airline industry. Load factor is an indicator of an airline's passenger-carrying capacity; it is also known as a measure of airline efficiency. Load factor in this study is calculated by dividing revenue passenger kilometer (RPK, the number of passengers multiplied by distance flown) by available seat kilometer (ASK, the number of available seats or the amount of available room multiplied by distance flown) (Jenatabadi and Ismail, 2007) . Because this study addresses not only the passenger aviation industry but also the cargo aviation industry, the calculation of load factor is adjusted based on the available data. Babbie (2010) , to reduce any subjectivity in the calculation of business risk disclosure scores and to better ensure the reliability of the scores, a second, independent researcher also assessed the disclosure of business risk items by each airline/aviation company in the sample. The results obtained by the independent researcher reveal no significant differences between the scores reported by each of the two researchers (p > 0.050). Hence, the potential subjectivity problem arising from the scoring procedure of the business risk disclosure instrument is not considered an issue in this study. Table 5 provides additional descriptive statistics for the firms in this study. The mean company size in the average year is $8,232,406,951 (total assets in US dollars). Overall, company size increases during the sample period, whereas government ownership decreases slightly (17.14% To enable a better understanding of the sample, Table 6 presents the business risk disclosure levels of the sample firms grouped by country cluster. The country cluster data show that the highest business risk disclosure scores are earned by firms in communitarian countries, with a mean value of 45 Note: Size = company size; MO = managerial ownership; GO = government ownership; BI = corporate governance; LEV = leverage ratio; PRO = profitability and LF = load factor
Findings
Descriptive results
Multiple regression results
This study explores the relationships between independent variables (country cluster, firm size, corporate governance mechanism, government ownership and managerial ownership), control variables (auditor type, profitability, leverage and load factor) and business risk disclosure by the airlines/aviation industry. The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 7 .
The results in Table 7 indicate that the country cluster variable is also a significant determinant (p = 0.001) of business risk disclosure for the entire period (pooled) from 2009 to 2011. The findings of this study are consistent with the findings of earlier studies that country cluster/origin/group are significant determinants that explain the variations in voluntary risk disclosure (Marshall and Weetman, 2002; . Differences among country clusters relating to market structures and stakeholder expectations are possible explanations for the different risk reporting practices in each cluster. Government ownership has a significant negative association with voluntary business risk disclosure during the three-year period (p = 0.061). This result is similar to the result reported by Vu et al. (2011) , who find that a higher level of government ownership reduces the level of voluntary disclosure.
As shown in Table 7 , the managerial ownership variable does not have any influence on the level of business risk disclosure. This finding is in line with Probohudono (2013b), which reports that managerial ownership has no effect on a company's risk reporting practices.
With regard to the control variables, the regression results in Table 7 show no significant association between auditor type and the level of business risk disclosure (all p > 0.100). The leverage variable has a significant impact on the level of business risk disclosure during the three-year sample period (p = 0.015). This implies that airlines/aviation firms with high leverage tend to disclose more risk information (Suhardjanto, 2008) . The results presented in Table 7 indicate that the profitability variable does not significantly affect the level of business risk disclosure (p > 0.100). This finding is consistent with the finding of Vu et al. (2011) . From 2009 to 2011, the load factor variable has a significant association with the level of business risk disclosure (p = 0.016). Load factor, which is a measure of airline performance, affects the level of business risk disclosure by airlines/aviation firms in APEC countries because an increased load factor, which provides proof of corporate performance, motivates managers to increase the level of business risk disclosure.
Conclusion, implications and limitations
Intense competition, high and volatile fuel costs combined with terrorist attacks, plane hijackings and air mishaps have made the airlines/aviation industry a very risky industry across the globe. Recent mishaps or many airlines/aviation firms have increased public scrutiny of this industry. Additional reporting, especially risk reporting, helps to improve market confidence, which in turn encourages an increased flow of financial capital to the market. This paper sheds some light on how the airlines/aviation industry report risk information. Specifically, it examines the extent and potential determinants of voluntary risk disclosure by the airlines/aviation industry in the APEC region. The results of this study contribute to the extant literature in many ways. First, this study finds that the level of risk disclosure has increased in recent years. In 2009, the level of business risk disclosure was 62.71%, whereas it was 64.79% and 63.14% in 2010 and 2011, respectively. Moreover, the risk reporting practices of airlines/aviation firms are better than the practices of firms in other industries. For example, find that the average disclosure score in the manufacturing industry is 41.81%
Furthermore, regression analysis shows that country cluster, firm size, government ownership, leverage, and load factor are potential determinants of the level of business risk disclosure by airlines/aviation firms in APEC countries. This study provides evidence that supports the possibility that country cluster plays an important role in voluntary risk disclosure by the airlines/aviation industry. It also finds that airlines/aviation firms in communitarian countries provide the highest level of business risk disclosure. Boolaky (2011) explains that risk reporting in communitarian countries is higher than in other country clusters because firms in communitarian countries focus on the demands of all stakeholders whereas firms in Anglo-Saxon countries focus primarily on the demands of shareholders.
The second significant finding is that firm size is positively associated with the extent of voluntary risk disclosure. This result is similar to the results of many First, the cost of information is lower for larger firms; thus, it is relatively less expensive for larger firms to disclose greater amounts of information than it is for smaller firms. Second, larger airlines/aviation firms may be subject to more public scrutiny and even to 'political' attention. As such, they tend to publicly disclose more risk information to lessen such public and political scrutiny.
A significant negative association between state ownership and the level of voluntary business risk disclosure is found during 2009-2011. This finding adds a new perspective to the literature on corporate voluntary disclosure. Because airlines/aviation firms are often considered to be representatives of the countries in which they are based, government intervention may be inevitable. In cases of government intervention, the government acts like a majority shareholder, and this particular shareholder is so powerful that it may eliminate the agency problem. In firms with significant government ownership, even the appointment of independent directors to the board may not provide an effective monitoring mechanism, given this study's finding that the proportion of independent directors has no significant effect on business risk reporting practices. Thus, it can be argued that there is a lack of real "principals" in airlines/aviation firms with high government ownership and that the managers of such firms have little incentive to publicly disclose information because these managers are not properly monitored.
As mentioned above, the proportion of independent directors on the boards of the sample firms seem to be relatively low (less than two-thirds of the total number of directors). The low proportion of independent directors may be the reason why corporate governance has no effect on the risk disclosure practices of the sample firms. If board independence is considered an effective firm monitoring mechanism, then airlines/aviation firms should ensure that there is an adequate number of independent directors on their respective company boards.
The airlines/aviation firms included this study may not necessarily be representative of all airlines/aviation firms. Nevertheless, this study provides several contributions to the literature on voluntary corporate disclosure, especially with respect to risk reporting practices. As a practical matter, this study suggests that regulators in APEC countries should increase enforcement of rules regarding the proportion of independent directors. Despite its contributions, this study is not without limitations. Future studies are encouraged to consider airlines/aviation firms in countries located across the globe. Additionally, perhaps future studies could conduct qualitative research to assess the usefulness of airlines' risk disclosures to various stakeholders.
